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TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION IN INDIANA
JEREMY S. WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
The study of the acquisition of title to land by long adverse posses-
sion is a study both of case law and of statutory provisions. Adverse
possession in both civil and common law jurisdictions is derived from
a statutory limitation period upon actions for the recovery of land. It
is predicated upon case law determining what type of possession will
suffice and what the results of an effective possession will be.
The policy of permitting acquisition of title to land by adverse
possession is well established. Adoption of some such rules appears to be
almost universal.' However, there might be some merit in having no
limitation rules whatsoever. If there were no such rules, persons against
whom claims were brought after a "reasonable" period might be pre-
judiced. To counter this threat a judicial officer might well be empowered
to make a decision about the period within which any action may be
brought; this discretion could be exercised on the sole ground of
whether prejudice might be suffered by the defendant. Such a system
could lead either to arbitrary and capricious rulings which would be to
the prejudice of plaintiff or defendant, or could harden into a well
recognized set of time limits (embodied not in a statutory code but
enshrined in judicial decisions) comparable to what we have now. The
latter alternative would have the certainty that we now enjoy, but might
be more flexible because of the more ready intervention of the judge.
Nevertheless, such a system would not have quite the same clarity,
which may come with rigidity, that statutory formulations yield.
THE CONCEPT OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
The effect of any statutory provision which limits the time within
which an action may be brought by an owner of land to recover posses-
sion of that land is to give a certain status to a person who has had
possession for the requisite period. The status is simply one of inviol-
* Professor of Law, Indianapolis Law School, Indiana University.
The author is indebted to Professor Melvin C. Poland and Dean R. W. Polston
of the Indianapolis Law School, Indiana University for having read this article in
typescript. They are not responsible for any errors which remain, nor do they necessar-
ily hold the views expressed herein.
1. There are several aboriginal customary systems of law which have nothing
corresponding to a limitation period.
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ability or immunity from attack, a feature common to all limitation
periods. Such limitation provisions commonly require that any action
must be brought within a specified time period. Thus, the consequence
of the statute is to bar legal and judicial remedies not asserted within
the specified time. In some cases, such as actions for personal injuries,
this is sufficient to settle the matter; but in other claims, such as those
involving debt or property, there may remain intact a right without a
remedy for its enforcement.2 Thus, even after the Statute of 1540,8 the
limitation period did not preclude extra-judicial recovery of the property
involved. The remedy alone was barred; the right was left intact.
Some common law jurisdictions, in addition to limiting the period
during which actions to recover land may be brought, now have statutory
provisions extinguishing any title or claim to the property on the part
of the dispossessed owner.4 This occurs because the bare title of the
adverse possessor has been coupled with occupation. In jurisdictions
which do not have a statute or common law rule directing extinction of
the title, it might be expected that a claimant would cast about for
alternate methods of recovering his land upon discovering that he had
been precluded by his delay from bringing an action. However, recorded
cases of out-of-time claimants recovering their property by other methods
do not seem to have been common.' Furthermore, some jurisdictions
that do not have a statutory provision barring the right as well as the
remedy have filled the statutory gap with judicial pronouncements that
2. If one who has a personal injury claim is barred from bringing action on that
claim, no further legal remedy remains. However, the early common law clearly per-
mitted a statutorily barred owner of land to regain possession of his property in a
peaceful manner. If he did so, the right and the remedy could once more be said to
have coincided and the owner could legally defend his possession against all other
claimants.
This common law rule has been altered by statute. In other jurisdictions, a similar
change has been effected by judicial decision. E.g., Cooper v. Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1,
41 N.E.2d 640 (1942). Even in early times, the common law remedy of self-help for a
landowner was reduced to a limitation period of four days from the date of the eject-
ment. H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUs ANGLIAR f. 163 (A. Twiss ed.
1878) ; T. PLUCKNETT, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I 63 (1962) ; A. SIMPSON, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 30 (1961).
3. Act of Limitation with Proviso, 32 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1540). In the case of recovery
of land, the act provided that a demandant who was unable to show a possession or
seisin within the limitation period should "from henceforth be utterly barred forever."
Id. This strong language, however, merely prevented subsequent legal action by the
demandant.
4. The first such provision was Real Property Limitation Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c.
27, § 34 (1833). American states with statutes directing extinction of the right include
California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Texas.
5. An example of such extra-curial recovery is found in Hemmings v. Stoke
Poges, [1920] 1 K.B. 720. In that case, the owner was barred by statute.
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the right is nevertheless barred. "When the bar of the statute of limita-
tions has run, a grant to the adverse possessor is presumed, and results
in extinguishing the title of the true owner as effectively as if there had
been a grant."' A statement to the same effect was made more recently
in Echterling v. Kalvaitis.'
Substantial evidence shows that appellees and their pre-
decessors in title had continuous, open and notorious, adverse
possession of land up to an established boundary-line fence for
a period of twenty years, which conferred fee-simple title to
the strip in question by operation of law, and the original title
of appellants was thereby extinguished
Whether these statements representing the modern law of Indiana are
warranted in the absence of a statutory provision is immaterial. It is
accepted that the effect of an adverse possession for the requisite period
is to render the possessor immune from the suit of the former owner.
Since it is improbable that there will be other legitimate claims, the
practical effect of a successful occupation will be clear title in almost all
cases.
Adverse possession is a possession inconsistent with the title of
the true owner. The owner could dislodge the adverse possessor at any
time within the limitation period. The fact that he does not may result
in the forfeiture of the land. Because these serious consequences may
ensue, the rules and presumptions surrounding adverse possession should
be examined with care so that the interests of plaintiff, defendant and
society as a whole will not be abridged. Constructions and fictions
should therefore be approached carefully since they may produce un-
expected consequences.
Policy Reasons for Adverse Possession
Allowing adverse possession throughout the statutory period to
confer actual title upon the adverse possessor has both advantages and
disadvantages. Both social benefit and detriment are derived by allowing
established proprietary rights to be upset. Several points may be made
with respect to the wisdom of legal rules which permit an adverse
possessor to acquire title.
First, it is often said that limitation statutes are statutes of repose."
6. 112 Ind. App. 1, 11, 41 N.E2d 640, 644 (1942).
7. 235 Ind. 141, 126 N.E.2d 573 (1956).
8. Id. at 147, 126 N.E.2d at 576.
9. C. PRESTON & G. NEwsoM, LIMITATION OF AcTIoNs 2 (3d ed. 1953). The
English Law Reform Committee has stated: "Certainty of title is a social need
Williams: Title by Adverse Possession
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
ADVERSE POSSESSION
It is clear that a claim on which no action has been taken for a long time
may cause hardship to a defendant. Even in the context of vested property
rights, it may be thought that to assert right and title after the passage
of a very long time may be immoral. It may even be that a claimant
could take advantage of a lapse of time to press a claim that had no
merit in the first place.'" The logical extension of this argument is that
those who are dilatory in enforcing their proprietary rights are to be
punished by having their property taken from them. However, it should
be noted that not all cases of adverse possession involve an unconscion-
able delay on the part of the owner."
Second, where the law allows an adverse possessor to acquire title,
the policy can be said to protect the interest of those persons who
utilize the land as fully as possible. Even where the possessor does little
with the property, at least he has done more than the owner who, ex
hypothesi, has done nothing at all. The utilization of land is valuable to
society as a whole. While this is perhaps the best argument in favor of
adverse possession, there must be some caution to insure that deprivation
of an owner's vested property rights does not occur in a stealthy or other-
wise unfair way.
The third attribute of a limitation system involving real property
is that it fortifies the title of the possessor.12 It is axiomatic that it
and occupation of land which has long been unchallenged should not be disturbed." 14
ENGLISH LAW REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT 12, 36 (Cmnd. 3100 1966).
10. It has been suggested, both judicially and extrajudicially, that to plead the
statute is usually dishonest. 0. WEAVER, LIMITATIONS 3 (1939). One English judge
has stated: "All I would say is that, if the law does penalise good nature in this way,
the sooner it is changed the better." Haywood v. Challoner, [1968] 1 Q.B. 107, 119. The
"good nature" penalized was a failure to collect rent from an occupant.
11. In some circumstances, e.g., an encroachment over a boundary, an owner quite
reasonably may be unaware of the accrual of a cause of action. If the
notion that the claimant who does not comply with the limitation period is guilty
of some moral turpitude and therefore ought to be deprived of what would otherwise
be his right is to be extended into the sphere of vested property rights, the doctrine may
be seen to be analogous to that of estoppel. In both cases, a substantive right is removed
by a procedural device. See G. SPENcER-BowER & A. TURNER, ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTA-
nON 9 (2d ed. 1966). The same sort of inactivity that may cause the limitation period to
run against the owner of property may also give rise to an estoppel preventing him from
later asserting his right. Silence or inaction usually does not give rise to an estoppel
without a legal, not merely a moral or social, duty being imposed upon the silent
or inactive party. However, where a person having a right, title or claim to property
perceives another acting inconsistently therewith, he may be precluded from later
asserting his right against such party. Whereas the conduct of the other party must be
sufficiently brought to a landowner's notice in an estoppel, one whose land is being
possessed adversely need have no idea of the conduct of the other party. See generally
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARv. L. R~v. 135 (1918); Bordwell,
Disseisin and Adverse Possession, 33 YALE L.J. 1 (1923) ; Goodman, Adverse Posses-
sion of Land-Morality and Motive, 33 MOD. L. REv. 281 (1970).
12. It is thought unreasonable to expect a defendant to prove his title beyond
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becomes increasingly difficult to prove a certain act after a lapse of time.
On the other hand, to prove a longer possession of property becomes
easier after the effluxion of time. This feature, if employed in a limitation
system, can be used to correct errors of conveyancing and may be useful
in such matters as boundary disputes. Any simple rule determining
ownership which is dependant upon easily discerned criteria should
facilitate an accurate and quick appraisal of the relative rights of claim-
ants. This, in turn, should tend to diminish breaches of the peace. This
feature is applicable to any legislation which tends to protect innocent
adverse possession. Although the title of a deliberate and stealthy adverse
possessor is also fortified, it seems morally more justifiable to protect the
title of an innocent and mistaken encroacher upon the property of his
neighbor. In either case, it is certain that to allow long adverse possessiot,
to confer a title will at least permit the extent and character of the
ownership to correspond with the facts. The title acquired as the result cd
a successful occupation will conform with the extent and quality of
ownership assumed rather than with deeds or written records, aside from
the rather vague tax records, relating to the land.
Finally, with respect to the owner, ten years of inactivity on his
part could invariably (except in the case of his suffering from a disability)
be said to estop him morally from asserting his title. In other words, it
may be asserted that an owner of land has a moral duty to protect it
from invasion.
On the other hand, some have argued that it is morally wrong to
upset vested property rights.'" It is said that in its operation, the doctrine
amounts to the abrogation of a substantive right by a procedural device.
Mere silence or inaction is felt not to afford sufficient justification for
depriving a person of his land. There should at least be a positive duty
on the silent or inactive party before harmful consequences are visited
upon him. This argument is recognized in the doctrine of estoppel which
has a similar policy. It is implicit that such a duty ought not be imposed
upon a person merely because he owns land.
While the foregoing comments are simply assertions about the
the time limit imposed. A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 47 (1966).
Statutory provisions directing extinction of title contemporaneously with the barring
of the remedy recognize the interest of the adverse possessor of land and tend to
facilitate conveyancing. However, the argument may be made that the doctrine of
adverse possession has become more of a threat to certainty of title than a support of
it. The doctrine of adverse possession diminishes the reliance that may be placed on
documents or records. The argument of conveyancing convenience seems to have been
relied upon in the Preamble of the Act of Limitation with Proviso, 32 Hen. 8, c. 2
(1540).
13. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765).
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morality or immorality of the status quo, it is possible to take a more
tenable approach to the morality of adverse possesson. It may be thought
immoral for a landowner to be deprived of land without first having a
practical opportunity to defend himself against loss, particularly in situa-
tions involving encroachments and boundary mistakes. The argument
may be countered with the position that a landowner ought to look after
his land.
Classifications of Adverse Possession
Although there are myriad situations in which adverse possession
of land may occur, there are four which happen regularly. Because of
their frequency, they may profitably be mentioned here.
Encroachment upon neighboring land may take place either inten-
tionally or without design. Although the proposition is difficult to
verify, it would appear to be the case that encroachment over a boundary
is more likely to be innocent than intentional."' Although it will always
be an encroachment in the eye of the law for one party to occupy part of
his neighbor's land, there is a considerable practical difference between
various types of encroachments. Intrusions are often the result of the
agreement of landowners that the boundary fence between them should
not pass through a piece of land useless for farming, such as a wood,
thicket or gulley. In a city or heavily populated district the reason for
noncompliance with the boundary is more often a mistake in surveying
or a misdescription. This may be very costly in terms of the use to which
the land is presently being put."5
Adverse possession may arise from situations in which a formal
relationship at one time existed between the parties. These might include
circumstances where a licensee, tenant or mortgagor holds land adversely
to the interests of his licensor, landlord or mortgagee. Occasionally, a
purchaser of land enters into possession under an incomplete agreement
for sale, or the vendor does not complete a transfer of the land to the
purchaser. In these cases, the holding of the purchaser, tenant or mort-
gagor may well be adverse. In such situations, adverse possession through-
out the limitation period would entitle the occupant to claim a transfer of
14. On the importance of the intention of an occupier see Goodman, Adverse
Possession of Land in the Law of Limitation of Actions, 1967 (unpublished thesis in
University of Manchester Library). See also Chisholm v. Hall, [1959] A.C. 719; Hop-
good v. Brown, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 213.
15. An encroachment of one foot by a ten story building situated in a business
district may result in a rental price increase of $100,000 or more over the life of the
building. Some interesting figures regarding the cost of loss relevant to title insurance
may be found in Roberts, Title Insurance: State Regulation and the Public Perspective,
39 IND. L.J. 1, 5 (1963).
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the title to him. In these cases the onus will be on the claimant to
demonstrate that a possession which began by being derivative has
become adverse and independent.
Occasionally, a situation arises in which an adverse possessor
occupies land in an ostensibly deliberate manner. When this happens in
the case of abandoned land, it is manifestly beneficial to society since it
returns otherwise unused land to productivity. If possession is referable
to a mistake, it may not be so advantageous to society as a whole, since
the land might have been utilized by the owner had he been aware of
the true facts."
Other informal arrangements may lead to an adverse possession.
Such may be the case where a party with permission, for example,
a licensee of some type, holds adversely to the person strictly entitled.
Thus, one who was originally tolerated or encouraged to occupy land
may eventually claim the land for himself. An example of this, occurring
with some regularity, is where one relative farms land alone for a
deceased owner although several other relatives are entitled to a share
in the land. At first, the farmer may share out the proceeds and profits
of farming the land. But after some time, he may realize that he has put
much effort into working the land and has made various improvements.
He may then morally regard himself as the one solely entitled. Whether
he is legally entitled will often depend upon the quality of his possession,
i.e., whether he held adversely to the interests of the other persons
entitled for the requisite period.
Such informal arrangements, and others, are not uncommon. Rarely,
however, do they lead to adverse possession between the original parties
to the informal arrangement. A remote party who succeeds to the interest
of the beneficiary of the informal agreement is usually the party claiming
to have adversely possessed. While feelings of gratitude exist in the
original occupier of the land, these may not extend to his successors.
Thus, in Hughes v. Griffin,'" a man conveyed land to his nephew, the
plaintiff, although the grantor and his wife (the defendant) continued
to live there. After the grantor's death, the plaintiff brought action to
recover the land from the defendant. The defendant argued that both she
and her husband had lived on the property for twelve years subsequent
to the conveyance of the property and that she had, therefore, acquired
16. If the possession is by mistake, the benefit to society from use of the land
may be outweighed by the detriment suffered by the dispossessed landowner. Examples of
such possession are noted in Williams, Title by Limitation in a Registered Conveyanc-
ing System, 6 ALTA. L. REv. 67 (1967). See also Ruoff, First Registration of Titles
Acquired by Adverse Possession, 27 ColqvEy. (n.s.) 353 (1963).
17. [1969] 1 All E.R. 460. Accord, Haywood v. Challoner, [1967] 3 All E.R. 122.
Williams: Title by Adverse Possession
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
ADVERSE POSSESSION
title by limitation. The English Court of Appeal held that she had
occupied the land as a licensee of the plaintiff and, as such, had been
incapable of acquiring a title by long possession.
Adverse possessors may also be classified according to their state
of mind. The state of mind may have substantial consequences on the
legal nature of the possession and the ease with which it may be proved.
A classification on the basis of the state of mind of the adverse possessor
might be threefold.
First, there is the intentional squatter. Such a person deliberately
encloses the land of another, fences it and uses it as his own. If he does
so successfully, his title by adverse possession is often easily proved.
Next, there is the casual squatter, a tentative trespasser who later alters
and increases his occasional use of land. His acts of possession become
more intense and deliberate. He becomes less cautious and may use the
land in a permanent way or spend money upon it. There is some difficulty
in discovering when he first occupies adversely to the owner. In Indiana
this may often be determined by the time such possessor first pays taxes
upon the land.'" However, this may not always be taken as the point of
origin of the adverse possession since the tax records usually are not
sufficiently precise in describing the tract of land affected. Finally, the
innocent squatter may be a man who believes land to be his own. If his
assumption is mistaken, he will nevertheless acquire the land at the
expiry of the limitation period. It is common for encroachments to be
made in this fashion.
Whatever the state of mind of an adverse possessor, his possession
must conform to certain minimum standards. Chief among these are the
requirements concerning the length and continuity of the possession.
THE ELEMENTS OF POSSESSION
Length
The period within which an action may be brought to recover land
may vary from one jurisdiction to another, but it is always a relatively
long period.' In Indiana since 1951, the Code of Civil Procedure has
provided that actions for the recovery of possession of real property be
18. In Indiana and some other states, possession is not adverse until taxes on the
land are paid by the possessor. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
19. See Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession, 20 IowA L. REv. 551
(1935). One common feature of extinctive limitation provisions is that the period itself
is long. Avowedly acquisitive limitation periods often tend to be shorter. Indiana
may be argued to have the latter since the law requires that an occupier of land pay the
taxes upon that land before his possession will be considered adverse.
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brought within ten years of the accrual of the cause of action."° There are
several other statutory limitation periods relating to real property in
addition to this general period.2' One such general limitation period2
provides that actions for injuries to property other than personal property
shall only be brought within six years of the accrual of the cause of action.
The distinction between the applications of these two statutory periods
is, however, easy to make. If the remedy sought is a return or recovery
of real property, the applicable statutory period will be ten years, whereas
if the gist of the action is recompense for damage to the real property, the
period will be six years.2" In the latter case, namely an action in trespass
limited by the six year period, the cause of action may accrue from day
to day in the case of a continuing trespass, thereby enabling a new action
to be brought each time a new alleged act of trespass is committed.2"
Acquisition of title by adverse possession is predicated upon the
possibility that the owner might have brought an action to recover the
property within the limitation period but did not do so. Once a cause of
action has accrued, time runs inexorably irrespective of any physical or
legal difficulty attendant upon bringing an action. This is true even
though the owner may have been under some legal restraint or might have
found bringing the action impractical.25 Such practical impediments might
well be taken into account if a shorter limitation period were in effect.
To do so would, perhaps, avoid charges of unjust treatment of a land-
owner who was unaware of a neighbor's encroachment over the boundary
line.
Continuity
In order to be valid, the adverse possession must exist continuously
20. 34 IND. CODE art. 1, ch. 2, § 2 (1971). See M. STREET, INDIANA TimE TO
REAL PROPERTY § 348 (1933) ; 2 A. WOOD, LIMITATIONS 1218 et seq. (4th ed. 1916).
21. E.g., the third, fourth and sixth clauses of 34 IND. CODE art. 1, ch. 2, § 2
(1971) deal with real property, as does the third clause of 34 INn. CODE art. 1, ch. 1, §
1 (1971). Certain of the clauses relate only to the sale of real property on execution
of judgment. Even if these are not considered, there are still far too many statutory
limitation periods relating to real property. Some measure of order should be
synthesized from the confusion which now surrounds both limitation periods and suits
to quiet title. See Note, Quiet Title Actions in Indiana: Suggested Reform, 39 IND.
L.J. 807 (1963).
22. 34 IND. CODE art. 1, ch. 2, § 1 (1971).
23. For the application of this distinction compare the following cases: Matanich v.
American Oil Co., 139 Ind. App. 145, 216 N.E.2d 359 (1966); Buckel v. Auer, 68
Ind. App. 320, 120 N.E. 437 (1918); Seigmund v. Tyner, 52 Ind. App. 581, 101 N.E.
20 (1913) ; Southern Indiana Ry. Co. v. Brown, 30 Ind. App. 684 (1903).
24. Cooper v. Crabtree, 20 Ch. D. 589 (1882).
25. Moses v. Lovegrove, [1952] 2 Q.B. 533. This would seem to be so on principle
notwithstanding the decision in State ex rel. Pink v. Cockley, 110 Ind. App. 417, 37
N.E.2d 284 (1941).
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throughout the limitation period. An abandonment and resumption of
possession will not constitute continuous possession. The reason is
generally said to be that there must be someone against whom an action
may be brought. Any such break in an otherwise continuous adverse
possession will interrupt the possession at the time at which the hiatus
occurs." If the interruption occurs before completion of the statutory
period, then a new taking of adverse possession must occur and be
completed before the remedy of the owner is barred. The character
which the possession must assume in order to be treated as legally con-
tinuous may depend upon the climate and other physical characteristics
of the land. This is really an aspect of the quality of possession of the
land. Clearly, if the land in the vicinity of the adversely possessed land is
ordinarily used for farming and is covered with snow for three months
of the year, it would be unreasonable to expect an adverse possessor to
exercise possession during those three months. Failure to exercise pos-
session under such circumstances would not be regarded as a discon-
tinuance or abandonment of possession.2"
Normally, the application of the rules of continuity will require that
one adverse possessor occupy the land for the whole of the statutory
period. In certain circumstances, however, it is possible for two or more
persons to effectively possess the land consecutively for the statutory
period. Under this doctrine, two or more successive possessions, each of
less than ten years, may be "tacked" together to make one possession of
more than ten years. The leading Indiana case on this doctrine is Cooper
v. Tarpley.2" In that case the court stated:
It is settled that the statutory period of possession need not
be maintained by one person. Successive periods of tenancy
by different tenants may be tacked to constitute the necessary
period for adverse possession to defeat the title of the record
owner, if each of the successive tenants claimed to hold and was
in possession, under his predecessor. ...
Appellants insist that privity of title which comes from
transfer of title or assumed title by deed, by law, or by descent
is necessary for tacking successive periods of adverse possession.
We do not so understand the law. The requisite privity is
26. Generally, if an intruder relinquishes possession of land without acquiring
title to it, the rights of the original owner remain unscathed. Handley v. Archibald, 30
Can. S. Ct. 130 (1899) ; Trustees, Executors and Agency Co. v. Short, 13 App. Cas. 793
(1888).
27. Coffin v. North American Land Co., 21 Ont. 80 (1891).
28. 112 Ind. App. 1, 41 N.E.2d 640 (1942).
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privity of possession and denotes merely a succession of rela-
tionship to the same thing.29
Thus, it appears that no formal relationship between successive
adverse possessors is necessary so long as their periods of possession
are sequential and upon the same land. That is, successive possessors
should possess without interval and should succeed in relationship to
the parcel of land. The rationale of requiring privity between successive
possessors may be to insure that there is a competent defendant through-
out the period."
An admission of non-entitlement by an adverse possessor during
the running of the limitation period will have the effect of interrupting
the period. This means merely that the adverse possessor may not rely
on a possession when he, in writing, disavows or negates any claim to
the land. Admittedly, the true juridical nature of the admission may be
to cast doubt on the quality of the adverse possession, but the effect of
the admission is one of interruption.81
Disability
Where the person against whom the adverse possession is taken
is, at the time of such taking of possession, suffering from a disability,
the effect is to extend the limitation period of the statute.82 A disability
must occur at the outset of the period in order to postpone the running
of time.8 In Indiana, the limitation period is inoperative during the
existence of a disability which affects the plaintiff at the time of accrual
of the cause of action; this is a standard feature of statutes of limitation.8"
Commonly, the time within which action may be brought after cessation
29. Id. at 8-9, 41 N.E.2d at 643.
30. This may adequately explain why successive occupiers of a particular office
or employment may be permitted to add their successive possessions where the office is
a corporate sole. See Haywood v. Challoner, [1967] 3 All E.R. 122 (C.A.).
31. In Indiana, the admission or acknowledgment must now be in writing. 34
IND. CODE art. 1, ch. 2, § 10 (1971). In an early case involving such an admission
the court stated that the "admission was sufficient to toll or interrupt the running of
the statute of limitations, if it had not fully run." Howard v. Twibell, 179 Ind. 67,
75, 100 N.E. 372, 375 (1912).
32. The ordinary limitation period is suspended during the existence of the
disability. This must be the result, for if the owner's right to bring an action is not
barred, the adverse possessor cannot be said to have gained a title against such owner,
notwithstanding the comments of the Appellate Court of Indiana in Triplett v.
Triplett, 135 Ind. App. 302, 316, 193 N.E.2d 662, 669 (1963). The court must be deemed
to have decided that case on the ground that there was no disability when the
adverse possession was first taken, and not on the ground that a disability would
never result in an extension of the limitation period.
33. Willis v. Earl Howe, [1893] 2 Ch. 545.
34. Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession, 20 IowA L. Rsv. 738 (1935).
Williams: Title by Adverse Possession
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
ADVERSE POSSESSION
of the disability will be somewhat shorter than the ordinary limitation
period for the class of action involved. In Indiana, the time allowed for
the bringing of an action begins at the time of removal of a disability and
is two years. 5 This also is a standard solution for limitation statutes
based upon common law. 8
The common law affords relief only to a potential plaintiff. It does
not allow a successor to take advantage of a disability of his own if the
cause of action did not actually accrue to the benefit of such successor,
as it ex hypothesi did not." Furthermore, as mentioned above, any
disability which occurs after first accrual of the cause of action will not
have the effect of suspending in any way the running of the limitation
period." If two or more disabilities exist at the same time upon the
same potential plaintiff, he will have the benefit of the longer of them.
But only one disability will be allowed to postpone the running of time.
Cumulative and successive disabilities will not be permitted to extend
the time for bringing suit."9
THE CHARACTER OF POSSESSION
Whether or not a possession will be sufficient to enable the possessor
eventually to become the owner depends upon two factors, the animus
and the corpus. The expressions refer to the intent with which possession
was taken and the physical characteristics of the occupation. Both physical
and mental elements must be present for possession to exist."0 However,
35. The pertinent statute states: "Any person being under legal disabilities
when the cause of action accrues may bring his action within two (2) years after
the disability is removed." 34 IND. CODE art. 1, ch. 2, § 5 (1971). Thus, where an
adverse possession is begun against an owner of land who is under a recognized dis-
ability, the owner's action for recovery of the land may be brought within two
years following removal of the disability. This is true even though the disability
continues for longer than the normal ten year limitation period.
36. Where a disability coincides with what would otherwise be the beginning
of the limitation period, the running of the period is simply suspended. There is no
interruption of the period once it has began to run. Provision for such an interruption
may be found in certain civil law jurisdictions. See Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse
Possession, 20 IowA L. Rpy. 738, 759 (1935); Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession,
17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 44, 78 (1939).
37. For example, an adverse possessor enters land. The limitation period begins to
run. If the owner dies and devises the land to a person under disability, the period
continues to run and is neither stopped nor interrupted. The devisee will be barred
from recovery when the period has run, and his disability will have had no effect.
38. In some states the occurance of a disability after the accrual of the cause
of action will have the effect of suspending the running of the period. In Indiana,
however, such subsequent disabilities will not affect the running of time. Terre Haute,
I. & E. Trac. Co. v. Reeves, 58 Ind. App. 326, 108 N.E. 275 (1915).
39. Walker v. Hill, 111 Ind. 223, 12 N.E. 387 (1887); Wright v. Kleyla,
104 Ind. 223, 4 N.E. 16 (1885).
40. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW 50
(1890).
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either element may supplement the other in that acts may be evidence of a
particular intention and an expressed intent may give color to otherwise
equivocal acts."' Nevertheless, mere assertions of ownership or mere
isolated acts of trespass will not, by themselves, amount to a taking of
possession.
Intention
The requisite intention of the adverse possessor varies according to
what is exacted by the law of the jurisdiction within which he possesses
land. The law of England specifies that the possession must be "adverse,"
but this is not a very stringent requirement. 2 In some cases, such as a
possession taken under a void lease, there is even a presumption that the
possession is adverse.4" Nevertheless, the basic position in England
remains that there should be an expressed or implied assertion of a right
to possession.44 It is this refusal to look at the state of mind of an
occupier which allows the theory of competing ownerships of land to
exist at common law. It is axiomatic that a wrongful possessor of land is
the owner as against all the world except one with a better title based
on an earlier possession which he has not abandoned. 5 This theory of
competing ownerships in land exists in all common law jurisdictions in
which there is no system of registration of title to land" or other
statutory displacement of the rule. The system of registration of title
41. Thus, a deed or other document asserting title or other expressions of intent
or right may affect the character of a possession so as to render it adverse. Sinclair v.
Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N.E. 37 (1913). Likewise, a parol agreement in-
dicating the limits of possession of the parties may have that same effect in law. Adams
v. Betz, 167 Ind. 161, 78 N.E. 649 (1906).
42. See Goodman, Adverse Possession of Land-Morality and-. Motive, 33
MOD. L. REv. 281, 284 (1970); Goodman, The Morality of Adverse Possession, 31
MOD. L. REV. 82 (1968); Goodman, Adverse Possession of Land in the Law of
Limitation of Actions, 1967 (unpublished thesis in University of Manchester Library).
However, it is suggested that there is a real moral difference between the acts of a
deliberate land stealer and the mistaken encroacher. The policy of the law in some
jurisdictions is to discourage the former while attempting to give security to the
latter.
43. Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts, 4 App. Cas. 324 (1870).
44. See Hughes v. Griffin, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 23; Williams Bros. Direct Supply
Co. v. Raftery, [1958] 1 Q.B. 159; Patterson v. Reigle, 4 Pa. 201 (1846).
45. Thus, at common law, a title of some strength could be obtained simply
by gaining possession of the land. This runs counter to the theory that land may have
but one "true owner." See F. LAWSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PROPERTY 40(1958); Hargreaves, Terminology and Title in Ejectment, 56 L.Q. REV. 376 (1940);
Holdsworth, Terminology and Title in Ejectment-A Reply, 56 L.Q. REV. 479 (1940) ;
Wiren, The Plea of Jus Tertii in Ejectment, 41 L.Q. REV. 139 (1925). Naturally
the aim of the Torrens system of registration of title to land is to install one person
as the "true owner."
46. Jurisdictions in Canada and Australia do have such schemes. In those jurisdic-
tions, ownership is conferred by an effective registration and by no other method.
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to land replaces in part the common law doctrines of ownership based
on possession.
In some jurisdictions it is necessary for the occupier to have some
color of title or of right in order for him to acquire title by adverse
possession. 7 Such a requirement naturally tends to prefer an occupier
with an innocent or mistaken state of mind over the deliberate evictor.
Where a particular state of mind is required of the adverse possessor, it
may be the result of a statute or the common law of the jurisdiction.
Both methods were exemplified in Stark v. Stanhope." In that case, the
law of Kansas was declared to be that a claim of title by adverse posses-
sion could be based on belief of ownership on the part of the possessor.
It is clear that the courts will often be in the position of having to
pass on which of two or more parties has the better right to possession,""
but this is not at all the same as saying that possession cannot be adverse
without a claim of right by the possessor. There may well occur cases in
which an adverse possessor has been consistently in possession for many
years without a claim of right and no other person is available to dispute
his claim. The adverse possessor should be able to acquire title in such
circumstances. All the social arguments in favor of adverse possession
dictate that such a possessor should be quieted in possession. Thus,
several states, e.g., New York, have emasculated the statutory or common
law requirement of color of title so as to validate as an adverse possession
any open and continuous occupation that might be taken by an owner
47. Alabama, Georgia, New Mexico and South Dakota require either color of
title or good faith. See Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession, 20 IOWA L.
REv. 551, 553 (1935); Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rxv.
532, 535, 553 n.54 (1939); Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv.
44 (1939). Such requirement is also a characteristic of such civil law systems as those
in South Africa and Quebec. The origin of these requirements clearly is to be found
in the justa causa and bona fides necessary for usucapio in classical Roman law.
48. 206 Kan. 428, 480 P.2d 72 (1971). There, a common law requirement of
hostility was statutorily amended to include a belief of ownership or a claim knowingly
adverse.
49. While it is suggested that this situation occurred in Rickard v. Williams,
20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 59 (1882), Justice Story asserted that possession would be
prima facie evidence of ownership only where accompanied by a claim to the fee. Id.
at 105. Since this was a decision of the United States Supreme Court, it has been
thought to be the fons et origo of the requirement of color of title. The notion that
a claim of right is essential may now be discounted in the great majority of states,
although the idea is still to be found in some jurisdictions where a boundary dispute
is involved. See Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 532 (1939) ;
Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 44 (1939). It has been said
that the American courts, by eliminating the need for a claim of right, have established
a doctrine of gaining title by prescription similar to the doctrine of acquiring easements
by prescription. Bordwell, Disseisin and Adverse Possession (parts 1-3), 33 YAIx
L.J. 1, 141, 285 (1923-24).
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of the land .in ordinary circumstances."0 This is now the dominant view
despite judicial pronouncements regarding the relevance of the motive,
intention or bona fides of the possessor.5
In Indiana there is no statutory provision requiring a claim of title,
or its equivalent, before a possession may be said to be adverse. Further-
more, the judicial authorities are to the effect that color of title is not
necessary to constitute an adverse possession.5" Thus, Indiana may be
said to subscribe to the dominant and logical view in that it does not
promote non-adverse possession. However, it should be noted that some-
what the same effect as requiring color of title is achieved by the pro-
vision that a possessor, to be in adverse possession, must pay taxes due
on the land so possessed. 3
Some jurisdictions have both systems and make a distinction between
occupation with color of title and occupation without it. 4 Some of the
states provide a special short period of limitation for actions to recover
land in certain cases such as from persons "in peaceful and adverse
possession thereof under color of title." 5 While the shorter period is
allotted to occupiers with color of title in such jurisdictions, a longer
statutory period serves as the general limitation period for all other
cases. These may be referred to, respectively, as acquisitive and extinctive
limitation periods. The provision of two separate periods, one a short
one with stringent requirements and the other a longer one with rather
lax requirements, is usual in civil law systems and has its counterpart in
Roman law.56 Jurisdictions in which such a dual system operates may
50. See notes 48 supra and 52 infra.
51. See note 52 infra.
52. Terry v. Davenport, 185 Ind. 561, 112 N.E. 998 (1916) ; Herff v. Griggs, 121
Ind. 471, 23 N.E. 279 (1890); Roots v. Beck, 109 Ind. 472, 9 N.E. 698 (1887);
Jeffersonville M.I.R. Co. v. Dyler, 60 Ind. 383 (1879); Hargis v. Congressional Tp.,
29 Ind. 70 (1867). Contra, Maple v. Stevenson, 122 Ind. 368, 23 N.E. 854 (1890). The
point seems to have been finally settled by the Appellate Court of Indiana in Cooper
v. Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1, 41 N.E.2d 640 (1942). Judge Flanagan stated that "[iut
is not essential to the acquisition of title by adverse possession that the entry should
be under color of title. The absence of color of title only affects the extent of posses-
sion." Id. at 7, 41 N.E.2d at 642.
53. 32 IND. CODE art. 1, ch. 20, § 1 (1971). See Farabaugh & Arnold, Commentaries
on the Public Acts of Indiana, 1927-Il. The Adverse Possession Act, 4 IND. L.J. 112
(1928) ; Gavit, In Defense of the Indiana Adverse Possession Act of 1927, 4 IND.
L.J. 321 (1929).
54. See note 55 infra.
55. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. arts. 5507, 5508 (1958). See also Larson, Limitations
on Actions for Real Property: The Texas Five Year Statute, 18 Sw. L.J. 385
(1964) ; Larson, Disabilities and Actions for the Recovery of Land in Texas, 16
Sw. L.J. 590 (1962); Larson, Texas Limitations: The Twenty Five Year Statutes,
15 Sw. L.J. 177 (1961).
56. In classical Roman law, usucapio of land could be accomplished in two
years if both good faith and a claim of title were present. The doctrine of longissimi
Williams: Title by Adverse Possession
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
ADVERSE POSSESSION
often have some difficulty in deciding whether one who encroaches on
his neighbor's land had color of title. In connection with this inquiry,
general presumptions as to the intent of an encroaching land owner have
been made. Whereas some have opined that the encroaching owner is
presumed to occupy under color of title all that he in fact occupies, others
have concluded that the true presumption is that an owner of land makes
claim only to that tract of land which he actually does own." Since an
ordinary owner does not usually address his mind to the possibility that
the actual boundary does not correspond with the legal description, both
presumptions contain an element of fiction. There would appear to be
equal merit in either presumption. Policy grounds may favor acknowl-
edging the title of the record owner if possible."
Physical Character
Many rules affect the physical nature of the adverse possession.
The adverse possessor is required to use and enjoy the land involved.
The degree of use should correspond to the nature of the land, and only
the tract of land actually occupied may be acquired. The degree of use
required will depend upon the physical characteristics of the land and the
way in which a reasonably prudent owner would exercise possession over
such land." Either climate or the physical nature or situation of the land
may justify a use and enjoyment less full than it might otherwise be.6" It
is always open to the adverse possessor to occupy the land in a way that
is unusual or uncontemplated by the average owner of similar land,
provided, however, that the possession is deemed to be adequate by the
court. "' It is also said that the possession ought to be exclusive.62 This is
temporis praescriptio developed in later Roman law to supplement the earlier rules
of usucapio. This subsequent doctrine conferred ownership upon one who held con-
tinuously for thirty years.
57. See note 52 supra.
58. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
59. Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 532, 542 (1939).
60. In Worthley v. Burbanks, 146 Ind. 534, 45 N.E. 779 (1897), the land in
dispute consisted of a few sand ridges and hills interspersed with sloughs which were
wholly unproductive and unfit for any kind of cultivation. The Supreme Court of
Indiana said:
We think that the facts found by the jury establish every use of the land of
which it was capable; that it was such use as was made by the owners of
like lands; that the appellant's dominion over the land was such that, under
the rules of law already stated, Burbanks was chargeable with notice thereof.
Id. at 544, 45 N.E. at 789.
61. The making of improvements is usually regarded as evidence of possession.
However, whether a particular act or structure will be termed an "improvement" depends
upon a very subjective notion of what enhances land. Even acts of despoliation and
waste might theoretically be evidence of possession if they occur over a sustained
period and are confined to a specific area.
62. See Worthley v. Burbanks, 146 Ind. 534, 45 N.E. 779 (1897); Cooper v.
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partly because only one party will be able to act with respect to the land
as an owner would. With regard to any given tract of land (on the
assumption that the owner is going to lose his right to recover it), the
court will not be placed in the invidious position of having to decide which
of two competing adverse possessors is the more worthy. The impasse
is resolved by concluding that neither co-possessor had accomplished
sufficient acts of adverse possessionr, and the owner of the land is not
barred. The requirement of exclusiveness is founded, at least in part, on
the assumption that an owner would exclude others since he has the right
to do so.
It is generally said that the acts of the adverse possessor must be
open and notorious. 3 All that this requirement amounts to is that the
owner, if reasonably diligent, should be able to discover the presence of
the adverse possessor. A furtive, hidden, concealed or stealthy use of the
property will not suffice for several reasons. First, a possessor who
attempts to remain concealed impliedly acknowledges the title to be in
another. In addition, his possession does not assert that degree of
dominion over the land which is deemed requisite for a successful
adverse possession. Therefore, the requirement of notoriety is nothing
more than that there should be an adequate possession. The adverse
occupier need not give notice, express or implied, to the owner of the
land. His presence on and acts of dominion over the land serve this
purpose.
The acts of the possessor in marking out the area of land alleged
to be possessed will be relevant in defining the extent of the land
possessed. However, acts of marking off, fencing or otherwise defining
the area occupied will not by themselves constitute possession, for suf-
ficiently concentrated acts of dominion within the enclosed area must
be effected. 4 If acts of a sufficiently intense nature are done over almost
all of an enclosed parcel of land, then there may be said to be a con-
Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1, 7, 41 N.E.2d 640, 642 (1942). In Matanich v. American Oil
Co., 139 Ind. App. 145, 216 N.E.2d 359 (1966), the court noted that
[p]roof of possession for more than 20 years of a great bulk of the property
under a deed describing the property is enough to show constructive pos-
session of the whole and is adequate to base a title in fee, in the absence of
a showing of adverse possession in another for 20 years.
Id. at 151, 216 N.E.2d at 362.
63. Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E.2d 917 (1937). This
requirement is impliedly retained in full force by 32 IND. CODE art. 1, ch. 20, § 1 (1971).
64. The absence of color of title only affects the extent of possession.
The rights of those who enter upon lands without color of title are confined to
that portion which is subjected to their actual possession.
Cooper v. Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1, 7, 41 N.E.2d 640, 642 (1942). See Walsh, Title
by Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 532, 546 (1939).
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structive possession of the remaining portion of the land provided there
is sufficient evidence of intention to possess and also color of title on the
part of the adverse possessor. 5
In Indiana, an overriding concern in the consideration of the
character of adverse possession is that the person in possession must pay
all taxes and assessments on the land before his possession will be con-
sidered adverse. The so-called Adverse Possession Act reads, in relevant
part:
Hereafter in any suit to establish title to lands or real estate
no possession thereof shall be deemed adverse to the owner in
such manner as to establish title or rights in and to such land
or real estate unless such adverse possessor or claimant shall
have paid and discharged all taxes and special assessments of
every nature falling due on such land or real estate during
the period he claims to have possessed the same adversely:
Provided, however, That nothing in this act shall relieve
any adverse possessor or claimant from proving all the elements
of title by adverse possession now required by law.8
This enactment clearly affects all the other requirements of adverse
possession. Since the requirement is that taxes and assessments should
be paid by the adverse possessor, there must be a state of mind almost
amounting to an assertion of title on the part of the adverse possessor.
In view of this, it may well be argued that the period of time limited
for adverse possession in Indiana, namely ten years, is too long. It also
may be argued that an adverse possessor must have a deliberately
acquisitive state of mind if he is to succeed in obtaining the property.
However, this is not the complete picture since the tax receipts and
certificates contain nothing like an accurate description or plan of the
parcel of land on which the taxes and assessments were made. Con-
sequently, the tax records will be of limited utility in some circumstances
such as encroachments. As a result, the courts have almost emasculated
the requirement that an adverse possessor by encroachment pay taxes on
the land so occupied."7 The practical result of these decisions is that the
occupation of land separate from other land that the occupier possesses
must be intentional or deliberate, while encroachment may be deliberate,
but need be only inadvertent or careless.
65. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
66. 32 IND. CODE art. 1, ch. 20, § 1 (1971).
67. Matanich v. American Oil Co., 139 Ind. App. 145, 216 N.E.2d 359 (1966).
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THE EFFECT OF POSSESSION
The effect of taking possession for the requisite period is twofold.
The former owner is prevented from bringing an action to recover
possession of the property since the limitation period for such an action
has expired. Furthermore, the adverse possessor is entitled, at the termin-
ation of the limitation period, to be recognized as the new owner either
by a declaratory judgment or decree in quiet title proceedings or other-
wise.6" The type of title obtained by an adverse possessor and the extent
to which it is dependent upon the title of the previous owner are questions
which are still not entirely settled by the decisions.6" The general rule is
that the adverse possessor obtains an estate qualitatively and quantitatively
commensurate with that held by the person against whom the adverse
possession was successful. Whether a freehold or a leasehold estate is
obtained depends primarily upon what was held by the ousted titleholder.
However, this result may be modified by the extent of the occupation of
the adverse possessor. Other covenants and restrictions binding the
estate acquired by an adverse possessor depend to a large extent upon
what bound the estate of the dispossessed owner. Restrictive covenants,
easements and other third party rights which run with the land and have
not been extinguished either by the adverse possessor or by the acts of
others interested prior to his entry will bind the newly acquired estate of
the adverse possessor.
The estate obtained will generally be a fee simple, and there is a
presumption that it will be."0 This presumption may be that the adverse
possessor claims as large an estate or interest in the land as is possible.
However, it is possible for a squatter to occupy against a tenant and to
obtain a leasehold estate.7 Where adverse possession is taken against
a leaseholder, it is not settled when the same possession may inure
against the landlord." Whether the occupation of the adverse possessor
will prevail against both tenant and landlord will depend upon all the
circumstances. The limitation period for the landlord's action to regain
possession will normally commence on the termination of the original
68. It should be noted that the provisions of the new Indiana Rules of Trial
Procedure allow for relief from a judgment which has been obtained against a person
suffering from a disability and who was not represented. IND. R. TPIAL P. TR. 60,
63.1 (A) (1).
69. An excellent article on this topic is Wylie, Adverse Possession: An Ailing
Concept?, 16 N. IR. L.Q. 467 (1965). See also Ballentine, Claim of Title in Adverse
Possession, 28 YALE L.J. 219 (1919) ; Challis, The Squatter's Case, 5 L.Q. lRv. 185
(1889).
70. Fairweather v. St. Marylebone Property Co. Ltd., [1963] A.C. 510.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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lease.7" The adverse occupant of leasehold land will nearly always be
obliged to pay rent and, according to the basis on which the rent is paid,
will become a periodic tenant. If he takes advantage of the previous
tenant's lease, he may be estopped from denying that he has adopted it,
and will therefore make himself subject to the covenants contained
therein."4
The adverse possessor will gain the estate only in the land that he
has actually occupied; he will not obtain any rights incidental to the land
though use of the land is inconvenient or impossible without such rights.
Specific rules govern acquisition of incorporeal hereditaments, and such
rules must be strictly complied with before any such rights over the land
of another will be acquired. This may be so even when it is impossible
for the adverse possessor lawfully to reach land recently acquired by
him.7
In some jurisdictions the position of an innocent third party pur-
chaser is protected."' The normal rule is that the estate owner dispossessed
for the statutory period can sell no more than he has. Since the successful
adverse possessor manages to extinguish the right of the former owner,
the latter cannot transfer anything. However, some English, Canadian
and Australian jurisdictions protect the bona fide purchaser for value
who is without notice of the interest of the possessor. In these jurisdic-
tions, the purchaser obtains a better title to the land than the vendor
had, and the adverse possessor's interest is abridged correspondingly. 7
Although this concept is not unfamiliar to commercial lawyers, it is not
the usual rule with respect to adverse possession of land. Normally, the
notice that would follow a survey and a visual inspection of the premises
is attributed to a purchaser. In Indiana, Trial Rule 63.1 (A)"8 attempts
to reverse this position to protect a purchaser of land who took possession
in good faith and without notice. It should be noted that this rule may
not have the desired effect, for it is couched in terms of barring the
remedy and does not acknowledge the apparent legal position of a
successful adverse possessor in Indiana, namely that he becomes fully
73. There is some doubt whether a tenant dispossessed for the limitation period
may accelerate the process by surrendering his extinguished lease. See Fairweather v.
St. Marylebone Property Co. Ltd., [1963] A.C. 510.
74. E.R. Ives v. High, [1967] 2 Q.B. 379.
75. See Lewis v. Plunket, [1937] 1 All F.R. 530; Iredale v. Loudon, 40 Can. S. Ct.
313 (1908); Tichborne v. Weir, 8 T.L.R. 735 (1892) ; Wilkes v. Greenway, 6 T.L.R.
449 (1890).
76. Matanich v. American Oil Co., 139 Ind. App. 145, 216 N.E.2d 359 (1966).
77. See Boyczuk v. Perry, [1948] 1 W.W.R. 495; Dobek v. Jennings, [1928] 1
D.L.R. 736.
78. IND. R. TRIAL P. TR. 63.1(A).
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entitled to the property."9 Furthermore, it may not be thought justifiable
to deprive an owner of his land in favor of one who did not conduct an
adequate inspection and survey. Thus, whether this rule will have its
intended effect is still uncertain.
CONCLUSION
Although there are many matters on which there is inadequate
authority in this field, it is demonstrable that the general effect of
permitting adverse possession to ripen into title is benign. As long as no
scheme of registration of title to land is brought into effect, the institution
will remain an asset to Indiana society. The policy reasons for the
existence of the institution, as set out above, should form the explicit
basis for judicial decisions on adverse possession. Had such policy reasons
formed the explicit basis for decisions in the past, there probably would
have been far fewer cases in which land was occupied by a person who
had no possibility of ultimately acquiring the land for himself.
79. The rule reads, in relevant part:
[T]he tolling or extension of the statute of limitations or other bar of a
claim to the property shall be ineffective against a purchaser of an interest
in land or a purchaser or lien creditor who acquires an interest in personal
property and who claims such interest under or because of such judgment,
such tolling or such extension if :
(1) The purchaser of land gives value and perfects of record or takes
possession of the land in good faith and without notice of the avoidance,
tolling or extension while the person against whom he claims is not in pos-
session of the land and before he has filed notice in the lis pendens record
of the county where the land is located . ...
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